A Solution to Frauds in Digital (Electoral) Voting: Beyond Safety
Quick Update (October 18, 2019): Recently, I found out that the system I had previously proposed here basically already exists and is currently under implementation all over the world. Its technical name is End-to-End Verifiable Voting Systems (with optional Homomorphic Encryption). It is explained in this Numberphile video from 2016, featuring Professor Ron Rivest, one of the creators of the widely used RSA encryption paradigm.
Recently, and with reason, the debate around digital (electoral) voting has been receiving more and more attention, with the most important topic being the vulnerability of the information. To solve the problem, the vast majority of solutions essentially recommend going back to good old manual counting. But is it really better than what technology has to offer?
What is going to be explained next is a possible solution: there is a way to use technology to solve the security issue, and go even beyond it, offering authenticity and accountability.
This discussion is very analogous to the security problems posed by the internet not so long ago, digital frauds were big threats, and many even opted for leaving the virtual world due to the frustrations and thefts. The problem was, nevertheless, slowly, minimized, to the point where it has become something secondary and that happens automatically and almost completely in the backstage through modern security protocols. But what was the main reason for this progress? In short: cryptography. We have adopted a very secure method based on prime numbers which is, in practice, unbreakable, since the only way to decipher the information would demand astronomical computational resources — obviously, humans are a source of vulnerability that is still inherent. In an excessively succinct overview, the algorithm uses a public key, which cryptographs any information whose access should be restricted to the end-receiver; and a private key, with which the receiver will decode the message safely. The analogy widely used to explain this method is to replace the public key for a lock, and the private key for a regular key, one that, to be replicated, would require the god of all locksmiths to work day in and day out for ages.
Additionally, related to the protection of the information, we have other problems, like authenticity, that is, to know if the sender of the public-private key combination is indeed who he or she claims to be. However, this was pragmatically solved with the advent of authentication institutes. As a curiosity, one minor concession on the safety of this algorithm must be made, related to quantum technology: if it is made possible on a larger scale, the encryption we use safely today could be cracked easily — not so minor a concession… although it could be argued that we would only need to adapt to quantum cryptography; there will always be the apocalyptical scenario where we lose all of our information without ever knowing it.
Finally, with such a powerful tool in our hands, we can go back to the main topic and propose a solution to voting frauds. Initially, one might think cryptography would only help us with the problem of protecting the voting information, a measure which would not be enough to prevent voting frauds, since the government could simply erase all the content and replace it with something more agreeable with their intentions. But, as briefly mentioned before, authenticity is a possible attribute of the cited public-private key algorithm, in other words, it is possible to verify if the content being used is indeed the original. How would that be done in practice? Firstly, a more modern manifestation of the electoral documents would replace our classical ones: all the necessary documents would be encrypted with the public-private key pair; next, after the votes, the government would not only count them, much more than that, it would publish them, paradoxically, in a secret and transparent manner: roughly, an enormous worksheet with the data of each vote and voter, encrypted by the respective public keys, would render verification easy, accessible and safe for all, something inconceivable with the good old manual methods. In this situation, each citizen is expected to verify if his vote is indeed correct and, if there are no complaints, there is no fraud.
To conclude the discussion, it is imperative to reiterate the motto that technology is nothing but a means, which, invariably, only substitutes an older one, thereby maintaining the same problems of human improbity of its predecessor. It is on us to not regress in face of a new manifestation of something negative but to adapt the innovative technology which, most likely, will provide newer and more efficient ways — and maybe even more effective, as in this case — of dealing with the persistent original problem.